United Nations S/2002/1345

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 December 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 9 December 2002 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 29 November 2002, which I received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

02-73440 (E) 161202

Annex

Letter dated 29 November 2002 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Secretary-General

With reference to the forthcoming completion of the Amber Fox mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[1] on 15 December 2002 and the need for a follow-up mission, I have the pleasure to inform you of the latest North Atlantic Council decisions.

The Council agreed that Operation Amber Fox has been a success, and that thereafter there is a requirement for an international military presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The Council noted the European Union's expressed readiness to take over military operations in the country under appropriate conditions. It agreed that there will be a NATO presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from 16 December 2002, which will include a capability to provide support to international monitors. It also agreed that the Council will review the modalities of this continuing presence in February 2003.

The Council further agreed, without prejudice to future European Union decisions, that NATO will continue to assist the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with defence and security reform.

The NATO strategic political objectives for the post-15 December presence are:

- to minimize the risk of further destabilization
- to demonstrate support for the current political process and legitimate institutions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of an environment conducive to democratic governance, multi-ethnicity, stability, the rule of law and economic regeneration.

A clear distinction will be made between the operational and advisory elements of the future NATO presence.

The operational elements will:

- have the capability to liaise with the authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and other international organizations on the ground, particularly in the former crisis areas
- contribute, within means and capabilities, support for the international monitors, while acknowledging that the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has primary responsibility in this regard
- provide appropriate visibility to contribute to confidence.

The advisory elements will:

- contribute to assisting the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in taking ownership of security throughout the country

[1] Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

– be further developed on the basis of an assessment of achievements to date and the outstanding requirements of the former Yugoslav Republic or Macedonia

– be coordinated with ongoing bilateral and multilateral activities.

The Council approved an operational plan developed by our military authorities in accordance with the above guidelines (see enclosure).

In summary, we are proposing a presence that would be composed of the existing NATO Senior Military Representative and his headquarters, plus liaison and monitoring teams along with the appropriate command and control capability and force protection assets. All NATO elements will operate under the command of the Senior Military Representative. In an emergency, forces based outside the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would provide support.

The Council reconfirmed that any NATO presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after 15 December 2002, other than the existing Senior Military Representative, will be subject to authorization by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia authorities.

I will continue to keep you informed of future developments.

(*Signed*) George **Robertson**

Enclosure

Supreme Allied Commander Southern Europe, operation plan 10418, Allied Harmony

1. Situation

a. **Scope.** This operational plan provides military strategic direction for the conduct of NATO military engagement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the end of Operation Amber Fox on 15 December 2002. It will be undertaken following a request to NATO from the host Government and North Atlantic Council decisions.

b. **Strategic political objectives.** The NATO strategic political objectives are:

(1) To minimize the risk of further destabilization.

(2) To demonstrate support for the current political process and legitimate institutions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

(3) To contribute to the establishment and maintenance of an environment conducive to democratic governance, multi-ethnicity, stability, the rule of law and economic regeneration.

2. Mission

When directed by the North Atlantic Council, the Supreme Allied Commander Southern Europe will authorize the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces Southern Europe, as the Joint Force Commander, to conduct operational and advisory tasks and other supportive activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in order to contribute to the overall international community aim of stability in the country and the region.

3. Execution

a. **Assumptions**

(1) There will be a legal basis for any future NATO military engagement.

(2) The conditions and limitations under which NATO personnel will operate will be accepted and understood by all concerned bodies or parties.

(3) Any future NATO engagement will continue to include a civilian element.

(4) Some nations will maintain national support elements in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and will sustain and move forces via road and rail lines of communication through the country and Skopje airport. The lines of communication will remain a critical requirement for the time being.

(5) Forces and resources, including funding, will be provided as required. As this is being mounted by NATO at the request of the host Government, it will be a NATO only activity.

b. **Strategic military intent**

(1) *Strategic military objectives*. The next phase of NATO engagement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will not be based on support to international community monitors, but will relate to the broader objective of contributing to the overall international community aim of stability in the country and the region. The overall strategic effect required has a number of strands and objectives: first, to inspire confidence in the population, especially in the former crisis areas and promote further reconciliation, reintegration and the full adoption of the Framework Agreement. Second, to keep levels of tension low. Third, to discourage a resurgence of ethnically motivated violence or inappropriate action. Fourth, to show solidarity with, and support for, the country, its new democratically elected Government and its multi-ethnic population. Fifth, to reconstruct security structures to institutionalize stability through improvement and ownership by the host Government and, sixth, to demonstrate NATO engagement and its full support for the efforts of other international community organizations.

(2) *Operations design*. Key elements of the operations design will be a cohesive, coherent command, control, communications and intelligence structure, building upon the Senior Military Representative and NATO headquarters Skopje, and the ability to collect, produce and share information and intelligence. This must be linked with the employment of responsive, mobile elements for visible military engagement in the former crisis areas and the provision of accurate and timely situational awareness. Such elements must also have the ability to keep in touch with what is happening at ground level, the empathy to identify change and the visibility and credibility to reassure and deter through observation and profile. Being in the right place at the right time will be critical, as will the ability to harness the support of others to discourage inappropriate action and to report it for rectification. Mechanisms will be required to advise and coordinate with host Government authorities and neighbouring NATO-led forces on border security. On receipt of further political direction, the NATO advisory team within the Senior Military Representative's staff should be enhanced and directed to provide military-to-military advice on defence and security sector reforms. NATO forces are to be impartial throughout. All of these activities are to be conducted in close consultation and coordination with the NATO civilian presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and other international community agencies active in the country. Should the tactical situation require the provision of emergency support to international community monitors, where the host Government, which has responsibility in this area, is unable to assist, reserves may be committed from Kosovo by the Joint Force Commander, under predetermined arrangements.

(3) *Enabling activities*. KFOR will continue to mount operations on the Kosovo/former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia border, and in depth in the province of Kosovo, designed to prevent incursions and reduce manpower and materiel support for any nascent ethnic Albanian insurgent groups. Additionally, the Senior Military Representative is to continue to provide border security advice to his host Government and encourage it to coordinate on this issue with the appropriate authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

(4) *Limitations*

(a) NATO will not provide a safe and secure environment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This is the responsibility of the host Government.

(b) NATO will not conduct operations jointly with host Government forces.

(c) NATO will not use military force to maintain international community monitors' freedom of movement.

(d) NATO will not provide specific close protection for international community monitors, nor will it provide security for the monitors' facilities or buildings.

(e) NATO will not provide routine logistics, transport or communication support to the international community monitors.

(f) NATO forces will not provide escorts for returns of displaced persons and refugees or internally displaced persons, government forces returning to former conflict areas or non-governmental or international organizations.

(g) NATO will not be responsible for the implementation or enforcement of any agreements between and among the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and any other party.

(h) NATO forces will not serve as a security buffer between any ethnic groups or observe any geographical cantonization of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

(i) Although NATO forces will be involved in civil-military liaison activity, they are not to undertake practical civil-military cooperation activities of a humanitarian or sustainment nature.

(j) NATO forces are only to conduct mission-essential or life-saving mine, booby trap or unexploded ordnance disposal and/or marking. Mine clearance is a host nation responsibility.

c. **Key military tasks.** The key military tasks fall into operational and advisory bands:

(1) *Operational key military tasks*

(a) Conduct liaison and monitoring operations focused in the former crisis areas, maintaining links with host nation forces, local leaders, the population and international community organizations.

(b) Provide situational awareness of events in the former crisis areas.

(c) Facilitate the exchange of information related to liaison and monitoring activities in the former crisis areas and border security operations.

(d) Provide support to international community monitors, within means and capabilities.

(e) Provide advice/coordination and exchange information on border security with host nation authorities, the Commander of KFOR and the Senior Military Representative.

(f) Communicate the intent of NATO to the local population to support wider NATO information activities, including through visible presence.

(2) *Advisory key military tasks*. Following political guidance and taking account of ongoing bilateral and multilateral activities, provide military advice, coordinated with the NATO civilian presence, to the host Government under, inter alia, the Membership Action Plan, the Partnership Work Programme and defence and security sector reform activities.

d. **Military priorities**

(1) Information gathering and sharing.

(2) Liaison and coordination with host Government authorities and other international organizations on the ground, particularly in the former crisis areas.

(3) Provision of the appropriate support to international community monitors, within means and capabilities.

(4) Provision of the appropriate visibility to contribute to confidence and stability.

(5) Timely, coordinated and practical military advice to the host Government, based on an assessment of needs, to assist it in taking ownership of security throughout the country.

(6) Unity and coherency of command.

e. **Desired strategic military endstate.** The desired endstate is when NATO judges that progress towards lasting stability in the country is self-sustaining to the extent that there is no longer any need for a deployed NATO force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This allows the cessation of any NATO military activities specifically designed to contribute to the encouragement of stability. Any enduring NATO military presence in the country is represented by NATO headquarters Skopje, which will continue a range of activities according to the Senior Military Representative's terms of reference, commensurate with a normalized relationship between NATO and a partner country actively engaged upon its Membership Action Plan.

f. **Forces and resources.** The force will be made up of the Senior Military Representative and NATO headquarters Skopje, with an advisory staff element, liaison and monitoring teams, a signals unit, command and control helicopter flight and the necessary combat service support assets. Selected reserves and Medevac helicopters will be on call from NATO forces already based in Kosovo, under predetermined arrangements coordinated by the Joint Force Commander.

g. **Coordinating instructions**

(1) *Timings*. This phase of NATO engagement is to begin on 16 December 2002. Its progress will be reviewed by the chain of command in February 2003, with recommendations being passed to NATO headquarters for consideration by the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council.

Operational key military tasks will end on 15 June 2003, unless the North Atlantic Council directs otherwise. Advisory key military tasks will end on order.

(2) *Use of force*. Nothing will negate a commander's right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for unit and individual self-defence and force protection. All personnel have the right to exercise the inherent right of self-defence. Personnel in the field may be armed.

(3) *Support to international community monitors*

(a) Life-saving activity (e.g. Medevac or explosive ordnance disposal) may be provided on humanitarian grounds, within means and capabilities.

(b) Should an international community monitor perceive that his/her life or liberty may be threatened, the first recourse is to seek assistance from the host Government, which has responsibility in this area. Should the host Government be unable to assist, NATO forces may provide emergency support within means and capabilities. Steps are to be taken to resolve the situation quickly through rapid deployment of liaison and monitoring teams to the scene in order to increase profile, reassure those believing themselves to be at risk and to deter the perpetrators. Concurrently, complementary activities should be initiated in the political sphere through the "Principals" structure and, if necessary, reserves notified.

(c) If forces are required, reserves should be deployed from Kosovo. In this context, forces that may be called upon from Kosovo will, under arrangements made by the Joint Force Commander, be pre-identified and procedures for call forward and movement identified, agreed and practised. Rules of Engagement will also be in place to allow them to accomplish their potential tasks. Notice to move is to be kept under review and adjusted to suit the prevailing circumstances, within means and capabilities. Regular operational rehearsals are to be conducted to prove procedures, ensure familiarity and send signals of capability and intent. Should a particular threat be identified, reserves may be deployed into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and based there for specified periods for a particular purpose.

(4) *Status*. The status of the Senior Military Representative/NATO headquarters Skopje will be agreed during discussions led by NATO headquarters with the host Government on future NATO military engagement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

(5) *Release of information*. Information may be released to others in the international community and the host Government in accordance with current practice.

4. Service support

Extant logistic principles and procedures apply.

5. Command and signal

a. **Command and control.** All NATO military activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are to be conducted under the operational command of the Joint Force Commander and the tactical command of the Senior Military Representative. Unity and coherence of tactical command will be critical factors, thus ensuring that all activities are coordinated and appropriate to the mission.

b. **Coordination.** All NATO military engagement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be closely coordinated and conducted in concert with the activities of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative and other international community organizations active in the country. Coordination with KFOR on border security issues will also be an essential component of this operation.

Joseph W. **Ralston**
General, United States Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander Europe

United Nations S/2002/1346

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 December 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 10 December 2002 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to request that, in accordance with its previous practice, the Security Council invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the meeting of the Council being held today, Tuesday, 10 December 2002, on the report of the Secretary-General to the Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2002/1300).

(*Signed*) Dr. Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

02-73163 (E) 101202

United Nations A/57/642–S/2002/1347

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 December 2002

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-seventh session
Agenda item 160
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 10 December 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to draw your attention to the latest attack against Israel in violation of the Blue Line.

On Sunday morning, 8 December, at approximate 7.45 a.m. (local time), a large roadside bomb was detonated along the Blue Line, not far from Moshav Zarit in the Western Galilee. The explosion occurred as an Israel Defense Forces patrol vehicle passed by, indicating that the bomb was likely detonated by remote control. Two soldiers were seriously injured in the attack and were evacuated to a nearby hospital. A previously unknown group calling itself the Ramzi Nahra Shahid Group claimed responsibility for the attack, although evidence suggests the involvement of the terrorist organization Hizbullah.

Sunday's bombing along the Blue Line is far from an isolated incident. Since Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000, in full and confirmed compliance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), countless cross-border attacks have been perpetrated by terrorist groups operating freely in South Lebanon. To date, the Lebanese authorities have taken no steps to fulfil their obligations in accordance with the remaining provisions of resolution 425 (1978) — namely the establishment of their effective authority in the area and the restoration of international peace and security. The Government of Lebanon is also in violation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and established principles of international law, which clearly call upon all States to refrain from providing any support, whether active or passive, to all persons or entities involved in terrorist acts, and to ensure that their territory is not used as a base for cross-border attacks. Lebanon has also failed to comply with other provisions of that resolution, most significantly by refusing to freeze the assets of Hizbullah or close down the offices of the rejectionist Palestinian organizations that operate in Beirut.

Consequently, Israel holds the Government of Lebanon responsible for this act of terrorism and calls upon Lebanon to act immediately to respect its obligations under international law and Security Council resolutions. The Government of Syria,

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which occupies part of Lebanon with tens of thousands of troops and is the main power broker in the country, also bears responsibility for this attack.

I submit this letter in follow-up to previous letters detailing cross-border violations of the Blue Line dated 8 July 2002 (A/56/1001-S/2002/743), 10 April 2002, 3 April 2002 (A/56/899-S/2002/348), 2 April 2002 (A/56/898-S/2002/345), 21 March 2002 (A/56/884-S/2002/301), 24 January 2002 (A/56/793-S/2002/115), 17 January 2002 (A/56/778-S/2002/79), 24 October 2001 (A/56/507-S/2001/1012), 5 October 2001 (A/56/443-S/2001/942), 6 July 2001 (A/56/161-S/2001/673), 16 April 2001 (S/2001/367), 16 February 2001 (A/55/792-S/2001/142), 6 February 2001 (A/55/767-S/2001/111), 26 November 2000 (S/2000/1121), 23 October 2000 (S/2000/1011), 19 October 2000 (S/2000/1002) and 7 October 2000 (S/2000/969).

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 160, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aaron **Jacob**
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.